Mariner’s News

Nichols Bros. Boatbuilders and Kvichak Marine Industries, both well-known, Washington aluminum vessel builders, concurrently discovered cracking problems in newly-delivered, aluminum vessels -- Nichols Jet Cat Express and Kvichak’s Hula Kai. Both were proven designs built to specification, so the cracking was a mystery.

According to Pacific Maritime’s March 2002 edition, Nichols Bros. initially thought the problem was being caused by a shaft bearing, which was replaced. Because both vessels are passenger vessels, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was contacted and they carried out a materials testing program. The problem was traced to 5083 H321 aluminum plate used in the vessels’ construction. The plate is manufactured by Alcan Aluminum Corp and distributed by Integris Metals, formerly Reynolds Aluminum Supply Co.

A January 22, 2002 letter from Alcan to the USCG stated that the 5083 H321 aluminum alloy "..is specifically not guaranteed by Alcan Aluminum Corp. for marine use, since when exposed to salt water, it can be susceptible to corrosion". On February 7, 2002, Integris Metals wrote their customers "...to advise you that Alcan does not guarantee Alcan 5083 H321 aluminum alloy for marine use....". On February 11, USCG Marine Inspection Puget Sound issued an advisory about the fracturing and exfoliation problems in the two vessels and cautioned the continued use of Alcan 5083 H321 cold-rolled aluminum plate.

It appears that the problem 5083 H21 alloy originated in the Alcan mill in Oswego, New York, which had changed its production process. As described in Pacific Maritime, "Instead of hot-rolled alloy, the mill in Oswego changed to a cold-rolling process which, according to speculation by shipyard customers, didn’t integrate the magnesium in the alloy as well. In hot-rolled, marine-grade alloy, the magnesium is distributed evenly throughout the metal in very small quantities. The magnesium reacts with salt water, oxidizing and forming a white, hazy coating which actually acts to protect the aluminum plate. In the cold-rolled process the magnesium was apparently not sufficiently assimilated into the alloy, leaving pockets and veins, susceptible to the corrosive effects of salt water. The heat and vibration of engine room spaces serve to accelerate the process". Only when the problem 5083 H321 is exposed to salt water is it apparently susceptible to corrosion. Plate used topsides is likely not to develop corrosion. Both the Nichols and Kvichak vessels have had approximately 1/3 of their hull plating replaced. But Keith Whittemore, president of Kvichak, believes there may be as many as 30 boats built over the past several years with varying amounts of the problem plate. The company’s computerized, accurate records allow it to pinpoint effected vessels . The USCG is tracking the problem plate through the manufacturer and the distributor to see where and how much of it is out there across the U.S. Bryan Nichols, president of sales and marketing for Nichols Bros., notes Alcan’s and Integris’ complete lack of involvement in the problem. He adds that price was not a factor in the use of the H321 plate -- it was good quality until the manufacturing process was changed. Interestingly Alcan was recently re-certified by Lloyds as a supplier of marine-grade aluminum. A quick poll of a few B.C. aluminum builders established that some 5083 H321 is being used in new construction, but next-to-none is Alcan product. Victoria Shipyards’ construction of 20, search-and-rescue motor lifeboats is using 5456 marine alloy from Germany. Point Hope Shipyard is using 5083 H116 and H321 (DNV-certified) throughout the pilot launch under construction for the Pacific Pilotage. The aluminum was sourced world-wide, none from Alcan, nonetheless Point Hope is conducting metallurgy tests to be safe. Philbrooks Custom Yachts’ 65-foot express cruiser is all 5083 (Lloyds-approved), mostly from European sources, with one piece of Alcan 5083 in the superstructure, painted and away from salt water. Sylte Shipyard uses all 5086 alloy including the recently-launched motoryacht, High Maintenance as does Daigle Welding & Marine. ABD Aluminum Yachts is using 5086 (has since 1979; 5086 apparently replaced 5083 in the mid-’80s) on their 120-foot ocean expedition yacht, plus the harder 5183 marine alloy (which was used in the construction of the three PacifiCat fast ferries). Rob Morris

MELTING GLACIERS ACCELERATE RISING SEA LEVELS

Sea levels might rise at a far faster rate over the next 100 years than previously thought because of an acceleration in the rate at which glaciers are melting. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has found that mountain glaciers are more susceptible to global warming than was believed possible when it estimated sea-level changes over the coming century. Speaking at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Mark Meier, a glaciologist at the University of Colorado, said that the new research suggests that melting glaciers could result in a rise in sea levels of an extra eight inches (19cm) over the coming century, almost double the  figure that the IPCC estimated to be the maximum contribution from melting glaciers.

Combined with the effects of an expanding ocean caused by a warmer world, this would mean sea levels might be up to two feet (61cm) higher than present levels. "These estimates in sea-level rise may seem small, but a one-foot rise in sea level typically will cause a retreat of shoreline of 100 feet or more, which would have substantial social and economic impacts," Professor Meier said. Colorado glaciologists analysed the volume of the world's glaciers from several thousand years ago to the present day and paid particular attention to what has happened over the past 40 years, when global warming has become most noticeable. Glaciers are increasingly sensitive to global warming as air temperatures rise and larger glaciers, that currently do not influence sea levels, will begin to have an effect as global temperatures rise and they  begin to melt. Some glaciers around the world now are smaller than they have been in the last several thousand years, Meier noted. The rate of ice loss since 1988 has more than doubled. The IPCC had estimated that melting glaciers would contribute to a sea-level rise of three millimetres per year, but it failed to take into account the large maritime glaciers because much of the data on them was then unavailable. These huge glaciers are the largest contributors to sea-level rise.  "The large glaciers of Alaska and adjacent Canada currently are contributing about half of the rate of global ice loss, exclusive of  Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. But they contain only 17 per cent of the glacier ice area," said Meier. In addition to glaciers and an expanding ocean, sea levels will also be affected by the rate at which the ice sheets of the Antarctic melt over the coming decades. Source: Steve Connor, http://news.independent.co.uk

The Prince Rupert Port Authority oversees the Atlin small cruiseship facility on the city’s waterfront but it hopes to build a $10 million terminal with federal funding. The proposal could see a new cruiseship dock constructed as soon as 2003, subject to a provincial government ante to complement federal funding. The federal government is expected to approve the Port’s business plan for expansion in the near future The plan  will not be controversial for what it says, but what it doesn't say.

The spring cruise season is about to begin with a million passengers on 25 mega-cruiseships which will soon be plying the B.C./Alaska Inside Passage. With 15 newbuilds on industry order sheets (by 2005) the northwest Pacific cruise traffic could feasibly double in the next decade, especially if the over-saturated Alaskan destinations could be relieved by the Prince Rupert seaport. Similar lobbying efforts for similar ventures are  under way in other deep port, coastal communities such as North Vancouver, Victoria, Nanaimo, Campbell River. The environmental impacts from an industry which doesn't significantly honour Canadian ocean sovereignty much beyond three miles would become a large stress factor. Most vessels in Canadian waters routinely discharge thousands of gallons of blackwater and graywater soon after they weigh anchor. Treatment sampling in Alaska in 2000 found 95% of vessels were in non-compliance with the U.S. federal Clean Water Act. With little to no ship-specific data, the precautionary principle suggests that so-called "treated discharges" should be viewed as "untreated" in our waters, given the Alaskan results. From ship collisions with whales to dirty air emissions and nutrient loading of pristine waters, the largely unregulated and untaxed, foreign cruiseship industry could soon become the cancer of the B.C. coast, instead of a giant leap for coastal community development.

Passenger "head taxes" in Alaska to pay for increased environmental monitoring and enforcement have always been a flashpoint for the industry. With such a new tax being currently proposed in Alaska, the funding of a northern Canadian terminal may be used as leverage to defeat such an environmental protection measure. In the past, the cruise industry has played off Alaskan communities against each other to prevent passenger surcharges. Now the foreign-flagged fleet will be able to pit a U.S. state against a Canadian province.

Construction of cruise facilities will permit Prince Rupert to become the B.C. turnaround port for environmentally-unsound and legally non-compliant cruiseships avoiding the closely scrutinized ports of call in Alaska, much as is currently the case with the cruise fleet's worst polluters deployed to Mexican destinations. Cruiseship shore activities could further exacerbate B.C. coastal communities. From passenger shuttle buses, to aircraft, to trains, to end-point resorts, the Alaskan host experience has been one where the cruise industry also owns the sources of shore activity and little revenue trickle-down occurs to local residents. If several new ships like the Star Princess (2600 passengers; 1000 crew), which is travelling the Inside Passage this season, were to disembark in one day the local residents would be over run with traffic pressures.

First Nations’ grievances regarding sea claims may become further aggravated as this industry's political clout becomes a significant factor. The federal and provincial integrated management on the Pacific coast remains in its infancy, at least in so far as actual protection for endangered species and habitat.

Now is the time to conserve and protect sensitive ecosystems suffering environmental and social impacts from increasing cruiseship activity. All marine stakeholders must seek the highest standards and best practices for the management of cruise growth and activities and disposition of all significant waste streams and environmental impacts with cruise ships operating from Baja, Mexico to the Bering Sea, Alaska. If large cruiseship-based tourism has a place in untouched, small B.C. ports, a profound new convergence of environmental orientation with economic need and opportunity must occur before the ‘jumbo-isation’ of this industry kills the goose that lays the golden egg. Source: Howard Breen, Oceans Blue Foundation, research@oceansblue.org

A paper presented to the U.S. Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers was entitled "An Investigation of Head-Sea Parametric Rolling and its Influence on Container Lashing Systems". It contained results from an investigation into the most costly containership casualty of all time. The post-Panamax C11-class containership APL China lost or damaged two-thirds of her deckload of about 1,300 containers in a North Pacific storm on her way from Kaohsiung to Seattle. At the time there were all sorts of wise words written about the sort of schedules containership masters were bound by and how safety was being sacrificed to expediency in both the design and operation of a new generation of monster containerships. The paper, which suggests that ships of this type and size may be particularly prone to the problems which did such ferocious damage to the C11, alerts the industry to a very worrying phenomenon indeed.

On the night in October, 1998, when APL China was overtaken by a violent storm, the master did precisely what his experience and training prompted -- reduced speed and brought the ship around to put the seas on the vessel's starboard bow. But the sea became more violent and confused and in the midst of this mayhem, with green seas as high as the running lights on the bridge and the foremast, the vessel became totally uncontrollable, pitching violently and rolling to 35-40 degrees. Container stacks collapsed, boxes disappeared over the side, a collapsing container corner casting punctured the main deck over the steering gear compartment. Ship and crew were fortunate to avoid disaster. That this had happened to one of the biggest and most powerful cargoships in the world was in itself remarkable, not least because these violent motions had occurred in head seas, with the vessel apparently riding out the storm. It is not unknown for containerships to be subject to heavy rolling in following seas. Indeed, IMO has published advice on the phenomenon. But here was a master doing what he had been advised to mitigate the situation and finding the motion even worse, with rolling well beyond the design limits of the container lashings. The investigation by the authors, which incorporated a detailed study of the weather and tank tests replicating the circumstances, demonstrates that it is indeed possible for such a large vessel to experience "parametric" rolling motion when heading into the weather. They also discovered that the hull design of the typical post-Panamax containership, with its heavily flared bow and wide, flat stern, lends itself to the phenomenon. In the MARIN model tank the vessel tested was moving into head seas, pitching moderately and scarcely rolling. Then, perhaps induced by rudder motion, the vessel takes a small roll to one side and, unexpectedly, roll angles hugely increase to more than 30 degrees in only five roll cycles, maintaining this violent motion.

The design of the vessel, the authors believe, is crucial in the vulnerability of a containership to this alarming behaviour, which occurs when the wave encounter period is about half the vessel's natural roll period. The design of the Panamax provides for the greatest width at deck level to be provided for box stowage but, unlike a full-bodied vessel, the bow flare and flared stern mean that, with the ship poised on the peak of a wave and the ends unsupported, alternating with a situation in which the bow and stern are supported, there are wide variations in stability. With the wave crest amidships there is little forward and aft in the underwater extremities to right the vessel, the stability being greatly diminished. But, with the vessel pitching forward and rolling heavily to one side, the wide flared forecastle effectively flings the ship back in the other direction. The authors, having established the existence of this alarming  phenomenon, make a number of recommendations, not the least important being that head sea parametric rolling "must be considered in the design and operation of certain vessels". The hull form development of future ships needs to take this problem into consideration. There are implications for contemporary shipping. What of all those other examples of mass loss of containers, albeit not quite so dramatic. Is parametric rolling responsible for some of these?

Some suggest that the phenomenon is unlikely to be confined to large containerships and that modern cruise liners, with high sides and flared bows and sterns, might be similarly affected. Further research would appear to be indicated. Source: Michael Gray www.lloydslist.com